Financial incentives to postpone retirement and further effects on employment — Evidence from a natural experiment

This paper examines the effect of the introduction of permanent benefit reductions for early retirees (i) on the duration until benefit claiming and (ii) on the duration until exit from gainful employment. I estimate discrete time duration models using different error term specifications. Administrative data containing the full earnings history of the individuals are used. Since the reform implementing the benefit reductions was a natural experiment, under some assumptions a causal effect can be identified. The permanent reduction of retirement benefit amounts causes a postponement of claiming benefits by about 14 months and a delay of employment exit by about 10 months on average.     

(When) Does Tit‐for‐tat Diplomacy in Trade Policy Pay Off?

In international relations, short‐run incentives for non‐cooperation often dominate. Yet, (external) institutions for enforcing cooperation are hampered by national sovereignty, supposedly strengthening the role of self‐enforcing mechanisms. This paper examines their scope with a focus on contingent protection aka tit‐for‐tat in trade policy. Highlighting various strategies in a partial equilibrium framework, we show that retaliation of non‐cooperative behaviour by limiting market access works as a disciplining device quite independently of supply and demand parameters. Our empirical findings are consistent with the theoretical results in that countries more frequently involved in WTO‐mediated disputes entailing tit‐for‐tat strategies pursue on average more liberal trade regimes.     

Exports,imports and growth: New evidence on Italy: 1863–2004

The nexus between trade and economic growth in Italy has been widely debated by historiography. However, there are no long run analyses on this topic that cover the whole span from Unification to present days. This paper contributes to fill this gap by investigating the relationship between real exports, imports and GDP in Italy from 1863 to 2004 by using cointegration analysis and causality tests. The outcome suggests that these variables comove in the long run but the direction of causality varies across time. In the period prior to the First World War import growth led GDP growth that in turn led export growth. Conversely, in the post-Second World War period we have a strong bidirectionality between imports and exports consequent on the increase in intra-industry trade. We also find a weak support for export-led growth and growth-led imports. This suggests that exports were not the only or the main driver of economic growth. There was probably a multiplicity of factors at work, among which high rates of capital formation and the expansion of internal demand probably stood out.     

The value of extended delegation in dynamic agency

One of the main advantages of delegation is that specific department level information is used. Its main disadvantage is probably that central management looses direct control over certain actions. In this paper we challenge this widely accepted trade-off. We show that delegation might be favorable even if specific knowledge is completely absent. We consider a firm that lives for two periods. Due to its organizational structure part of the tasks and decision rights is inevitably delegated to a subordinate (agent). The agent performs the tasks assigned to him, tantamount to personal effort, in each of the two periods. Besides this effort the decision to implement a particular project has to be made at the beginning of period two. With regard to the project choice, central management can decide to delegate it to the agent (decentralization). Alternatively it can make it personally (centralization). If the project choice is decentralized it remains unobservable for central management. Along with second period effort it must be motivated via an incentive contract written on period output.We analyze two different contracting regimes: long-term commitment and long-term renegotiation-proof contracts. With full commitment we find that centralization is indeed favorable as compared to delegation if no informational advantage exists. This confirms conventional wisdom. However, the result does not necessarily hold with renegotiation-proof contracts. Renegotiation-proofness may force central management to set too low second-period incentives. Delegation counteracts this effect as it allows central management to implicitly commit to a higher second-period incentive rate. This arises as both, personal effort and the project choice, rather than effort alone need to be motivated. A necessary condition for too low second-period incentives, and thus for delegation to be favorable, is a negative intertemporal correlation of output.     

Writing the differences: Poststructural ist pluralism,retextualization, and the construction of reflexive ethnographic narratives in consumption and market research

Representing social realities in a narrative form is central to the interpretive processes by which market‐oriented ethnographies are constructed. In recent years, the process of textualization has shifted from a taken‐for‐granted aspect of the ethnographic enterprise to a central focus of ethnographers’ reflexive considerations. This shift reflects the realization that textualization poses dilemmas of representation that can not be resolved through additional fieldwork or other methodological procedures. This paper addresses these workbench problems by devising an alternative narrative formretextualization‐based on a poststructuralist version of critical pluralistic analysis. We first discuss how non‐realist genres of ethnographic writing have emerged in response to a heightened sensitivity toward ideological positions embedded in research narratives. We then discuss how the use of retextualization can facilitate the development of reflexivity in consumption research by destabilizing the representational authority of the ethnographic text through expressions of divergence, dissensus, and contested interpretations.     

The Model of a Gender-Segregated Low-Income Economy Reconsidered: Evidence from Uganda

This paper examines Darity's model of gender-segregated low-income agrarian society in light of evidence from Uganda. It identifies three important features of the interactions between men and women which are likely to have economic effects but which are subsumed within Darity's schematic presentation. It suggests a reformulation of the Darity model in terms of a bargaining framework. This facilitates greater insights into gendered economic processes that otherwise are ignored, and investigation of a wider range of macro outcomes.     

The long-term effects of job search requirements: Evidence from the UK JSA reform

This paper investigates long-term returns from unemployment compensation, exploiting variation from the UK JSA reform of 1996, which implied a major increase in job search requirements for eligibility and in the related administrative hurdle. Search theory predicts that such changes should raise the proportion of nonclaimant nonemployed, with consequences on search effort and labor market attachment, and lower the reservation wage of the unemployed, with negative effects on post-unemployment wages. I test these ideas on longitudinal data from social security records (LLMDB). Using a difference in differences approach, I find that individuals who start an unemployment spell soon after JSA introduction, as opposed to 6 months earlier, are 2.5–3% more likely to move from unemployment into Incapacity Benefits spells, and 4–5% less likely to have positive earnings in the following year. This latter employment effect only vanishes 4 years after the initial unemployment shock. Also, annual earnings for the treated individuals are lower than for the non-treated. These results suggest that while tighter search requirements were successful in moving individuals off unemployment benefits, they were not successful in moving them onto stable or better jobs, with fairly long-lasting unintended consequences on a number of labor market outcomes.